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INTEREST GROUPS: MOVING BEYOND STATE-
CENTRIC MODELS 
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State-centric Anglo-American studies continue to dominate the interest group 
landscape (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, Jordan and Maloney 2007, Truman 1951). 
As a commanding ‘outside-in’ pressure on French scholarship, a long debate on 
defining France on the pluralism-corporatism spectrum has ensued (Keeler and Hall 
2001, Wilson 1987, 2008). The exceptional nature of interest representation in France 
has inspired a plethora of state-centric modeling. This chapter argues that an ‘inside-
out’ influence is gaining momentum, whereby French political sociological accounts 
underline the primacy of group behaviour (Courty 2006, Offerlé 2009, Mathieu 2009). 
Active in Europeanization research (Saurugger 2009), and social movement theory 
(Fillieule and Tartakowsky 2014), French scholars are leading the way in bringing the 
debate on interest representation beyond Anglo-American state-centric models.   
 
Keywords: Interest representation; comparative politics; political sociology; 
Europeanization; social movement theory 
 
The study of interest groups often revolves around various notions of the state in 
contemporary comparative politics (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, Beyers et al. 2012). 
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An interest group, after all, seeks to exploit influence and power within the corridors of 
government (Jordan and Maloney 2007, Truman 1951). From such an Anglo-American 
dominated viewpoint, the government is thus more or less open to such exploits, leading 
to a plethora of state-interest models based upon pluralist or corporatist national 
traditions. Hitherto underappreciated, the French contribution to this literature has 
largely been to emphasise the role of non-state sociological-based explanations for 
interest group behaviour (Courty 2006, Duriez 2004, Fillieule 2010, Jacquot and Woll 
2008, Mathieu 2007, Offerlé 2009, Saurugger 2008). This approach moves us away 
from narrowly defining such groups in relation to the state. Inspired by a wide variety 
of French, and associated non-French, scholarship this chapter argues that such a 
political sociological approach offers significant potential. 
 The first section of the chapter begins with an introduction to the study of 
interest groups in comparative perspective. It outlines some key definitions on what 
constitutes an interest group, as well as reflecting upon its relation to social movements 
and social movement theory. I then introduce Europeanisation as an emerging influence 
on national interest groups, with some definitional reflections. Lastly, this section 
presents mainstream understandings of interest group and state relations in comparative 
politics.  
The next section details the study of interest groups in France. It proceeds with 
historical and contemporary accounts of theorising the specific nature of French state-
group relations. I then identify the main ‘outside-in’ pressures in this field from Anglo-
American scholarship, which prioritises state driven accounts. I expand further with an 
assessment of mainstream state-centric accounts of inclusion and exclusion (Cole 2008, 
Keeler and Hall 2001, Wilson 1987, 2008). Their necessary dilution, in order to fit the 
French case, has resulted in a search for more appropriate models. The protest and 
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policy network models have been forwarded as potential approaches to state-group 
relations in France (Thompson 2003, Cole 2011, Vassallo 2010). However, even these 
models have not avoided criticism for their relative inapplicability to French state-
group relations (Epstein 1997, Elgie and Griggs 2000, Woll 2009).  
 The third part of the chapter presents the main ‘inside-out’ pressure from French 
based literature, inspired by political sociological accounts. I locate such a pressure 
firstly in Europeanisation literature where ties with the nation state are broken 
(Grossman 2003, 2004, Jacquot and Woll 2003, Saurugger 2009, 2007). I argue below 
that the real novelty in French literature is the emphasis on ‘group-centric’ accounts of 
interest representation. Drawing equally from related non-French accounts, it is argued 
that social movement theory provides an opportunity to further solidify a more ‘group-
centric’ approach. Associated more traditionally with social movements, it offers a 
series of analytical tools, which allow us to explore the role of interest groups 
independent – but mindful of – the state (Fillieule and Tartakowsky 2014, Mathieu 
2009, Offerlé 2009). Above all, it provides an opportunity to unleash ‘interest group’ 
studies from the straightjacket of ‘state-centric’ conceptual frameworks.           
 
THE STUDY OF INTEREST GROUPS 
 
This section covers the main definitional questions surrounding interest group research. 
It argues that interest groups and social movements (rather than the concept of ‘new 
social movements’) are not as distinct as they are often portrayed in the literature. 
Moreover, social movement theories offer significant potential for expanding our 
understanding of interest groups. It concludes with some introductory reflections on the 
influence of Europeanisation and the state on interest groups. 
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Interest groups and social movements 
 
Much of the literature on interest groups is based on case studies or cross sectional 
examinations of collective action. This has resulted in little reflection on the definition 
of an interest group, or indeed the field of study. The oft-cited Truman version 
concentrates on organisations, which make “certain claims upon other groups in society 
for the establishment, maintenance, or enhancement of forms of behaviour that are 
implied by shared attitudes” (1951: 33). In following, an interest group seeks to 
influence policy on targeted shared issues on the basis of its membership without any 
wish to govern. The study of interest groups is dominated inherently by the exploration 
of influence, exploitation and, above all, power. An interest group is, after all, 
“organized only for a specific collective political end… (without) seek(ing) to form a 
government, merely to influence public policy” (Jordan and Maloney 2007: 29). As a 
result, interest group studies have developed most notably within the field of 
comparative politics (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). 
 The political science origins of this field lead, most notably, to an intellectual 
enchantment with the state. Indeed, the raison d’être of an interest group within such 
definitions is predicated on its relationship to government or formal policy-making 
processes. Within an Anglo-American context, the phrase ‘interest group’ is regularly 
interchangeable with the Truman rhetoric of ‘pressure groups’. The object of such 
pressure has invariably been the state apparatus. The first dichotomy of such an 
approach rests upon exploring ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ interest groups. The exploration 
of interest groups in the US has tended to focus on the traditionally ‘insider’ powerful 
organisations. Outsider groups have become more recently the focus of studies in the 
 5 
UK based literature (Grant 2001). Binderkrantz (2005) reveals, for example, how 
interest groups in Denmark slip in and out of the political system. Her comparative 
analysis of strategies reminds us that such groups are dynamic entities. 
In one of the few attempts to differentiate between social movements and 
interest groups, Sydney Tarrow defines interest groups as “formal organisations, which 
activate already defined constituencies, often with dues paying or institutionally 
determined membership, in mainly non-contentious interaction with authorities” (1995: 
228-229). This definition is similar to mainstream political science versions (such as 
Truman or Jordan and Maloney above) whereby an interest group is a formalised 
grouping with a collective membership seeking to influence government and policy. 
Social movements are alternatively referred to as “collective challenges by groups with 
purposes and solidarity in sustained and mainly contentious interaction with elites, 
opponents and authorities” (1995: 229). However, recent work (e.g. Binderkantz 2005) 
calls into question the validity of differentiating along the lines here of contentious 
versus non-contentious action. It is argued, therefore, that we need to accept significant 
crossover between interest group and social movement studies. 
 
New social movements and social movement theory 
 
We do need to differentiate between New Social Movements (NSM) and Social 
Movement Theory (SMT). Largely attributed to Habermas, NSMs are a response to 
“the colonisation of the lifeworld” and “cultural impoverishment” (Crossley 2003: 
290). These phenomena have taken the form of politics ceasing to address issues of 
truly public concern. In following, NSMs have arisen in response to this colonised and 
impoverished context. These NSMs consisted of “those who traditional institutions had 
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forgotten or excluded” (ecologism, antinuclearism, feminism, consumerism and 
postmaterialism (Fillieule and Meyer 2001: 52). The concept of NSM refers specifically 
to the apparition of movements during the 60s/70s. It has been equally argued that the 
rise of the human rights or counter-globalisation movement represents examples of new 
NSMs.  
Social Movement theory provides, rather, a framework for studying group 
behaviour while allowing us to generate questions on how and why social mobilisation 
takes place (Kriesi 2004). In fact, a range of social movement theories has emerged 
over the past thirty years: Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT), Political Opportunity 
Structures (POS), Social Psychology (SP) and Social Networks (SN). This largely 
stems from different approaches and methodological choices from political scientists 
(mostly RMT and POS) and sociologists (often SP and SN). Similarly, European (SP) 
and American scholars (RMT) have built up particular approaches to social movement 
theory. It is argued that a combined approach to these theories has the ability to shed 
light on how and, to an extent, why not only movements – but also interest groups – 
are mobilised.  
 
Broadening our understanding of interest groups 
 
In general terms, there are two major groups of interest representation. Firstly, the 
‘occupational’ groups (trade unions, business, farmers etc.) are seen to be the most 
active, with sophisticated networks of power and influence with government. Such 
groups are often central to the study of interest groups (Baumgartner and Leech 1998). 
The ‘promotional’ groups (environment, feminist, consumer groups) have evolved 
quickly in recent years, but remain less influential in interest group studies. In 
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presenting a further interpretation of collective action, these ‘promotional’ groups are 
explicitly linked within to the notion of NSM. The origins of these ‘promotional’ groups 
are found in the emergence of new social movements (NSM) from the student protests 
of 1968 (Escafre-Duble 2010). The student movement of 1968 provided the motor for 
a variety of NSM (ecologism, antinuclearism, feminism, consumerism and 
postmaterialism). 
Promotional groups (feminists, anti-racism, environmentalism etc.) have, 
nevertheless, had little success on imposing their will on government. Whereas single-
issue groups wreaked havoc in UK or Germany, the French political system remained 
impermeable (Cole and Harguindeguy 2013). As is common among organisations that 
find their origins in the NSM of the 1970s, promotional groups have been largely forced 
into state relations based on pre-emption, incorporation, contestation and direct action. 
State-group relations have been impeding to such groups. We should, however, not 
irrevocably tie promotional groups to the study of NSM. Interest group studies have 
much to offer on understanding promotional groups. This new reality for national 
interest groups is most evident in the development of Europeanisation research.  
 
Interest groups in Europeanisation frameworks 
 
A key distinction in the literature that only appears hitherto implicitly is between the 
‘Europeanisation of interest groups’ and ‘Europeanisation and interest groups’. While 
the former presents a clear linkage between EU pull and interest group behaviour, the 
latter positions interest groups within a broader context of EU pressure that is 
transforming domestic institutions and policies. From the former perspective, the multi-
institutional nature of decision-making at the EU level creates a number of targets and 
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opportunities for interest groups (bottom-up approach). UK business groups found that 
they could access EU-level policy-makers through direct contact with EU officials, EU-
based groups as well as other national groupings that are in contact with EU officials 
(Fairbrass and Jordan 2003).  
In stark contrast to the former perspective, the application of Europeanisation 
and national interest representation is defined primarily as a top-down pressure that 
brings about changes in the domestic arena for non-governmental organisations 
(Exadaktylos and Radaelli 2009, Ladrech 1994). The EU is conceptualised as a motor 
for the potential transformation of the objectives, strategies and operating environment 
of a domestic actor. Therefore, Europeanisation refers to changes in national 
institutions and policy-making, which consequently influences the behaviour of 
national and sub-national non-governmental organisations. This process is, therefore, 
expected to bring a certain level of change in the traditional forms of interest 
articulation with the state.  
 
Models of Interest Group-State Interaction 
 
The state remains, overall, the central focus for interest group studies. Indeed, it is 
argued throughout this chapter that the primary ‘outside-in’ influence of Anglo-
American literature on understanding interest groups in France remains most 
observable in debates surrounding the insider/outsider dichotomy in relation to the 
nation-state. As explored below, comparative political accounts of interest groups in 
France were captured by a US disciplinary obsession with pluralism – or as termed here 
‘state-centric systems of interest representation’. Authors such as Truman (1951) 
argued vehemently that the rise of interest groups in the US symbolised a new modern 
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theory of political pluralism. A divisive normative reflection on interest groups led to 
the marginalisation of the field in the US until the 1990s (Tichenor and Harris 2005). 
American and British political scientists viewed France as an intriguing non-pluralised 
system of interest representation (Keeler and Hall 2001, Wilson 2008).  
 The pluralist model defines power as being shared among multiple groups that 
represent social and political forces in society. According to Wilson, “these groups 
confront government and each other in constant but shifting patterns of competition and 
cooperation that determine public policy…(while) the state moderates among the(se) 
conflicting demands… as it determines official policy” (1987: 18). The pluralist 
perspective no longer views the state as a formidable dominating force overpowering a 
weakly divided civil society (Beyers et al. 2012). Corporatist accounts have, on the 
other hand, concentrated on the tripartite relations between the state officials and the 
two key areas of capital and labour (Lavdas 2005).  
There has been a retreat among supporters of a pure corporatist stance to a 
‘meso-corporatist/neo-corporatism’ viewpoint. This form of corporatism 
acknowledges that state-group relations changes from one policy sub-system to 
another. Given the weakness of labour in certain policy systems, French corporatism, 
for example, is considered to be sectoral (Goyer 2008). Meso-corporatists define the 
policy-making process as being a closed negotiating process between government and 
privileged interest groups. These groups exercise an exclusive monopoly on access to 
policy formulation, while providing expert information and advice. As Shain 
comments, “corporatism is more than a model of policy-formualation, it is a model of 
social control…(where) open conflict is channeled into limited bargaining” (1980: 
191). 
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 Both pluralist and corporatist models have been applied (to the case of France 
as explored in the section below). They do not, however, offer an exhaustive account 
of state-group interaction. The state regularly calls upon a variety of devices and 
structures in order to rebuff the demands of even the most powerful interest groups. 
Similarly, interest groups enter into a range of relationships with the state in accordance 
with the sensitivity of the particular issue. Interest groups and government are 
constantly readjusting to changing political circumstances, in order to better achieve 
their objectives (Beyers et al. 2012). This observation has resulted in a plethora of 
comparative and France specific state-group modeling as explored in the next section. 
 
THE STUDY OF INTEREST GROUPS IN FRANCE 
 
The ‘exceptional’ nature of interest group behaviours in France has captured the 
attention of notably Anglo-American and French scholars in political science and 
political sociology. The perceived exclusionary approach of the French state towards 
interest representation has resulted in an explosion of state-group relations theorisation, 
from new ‘French-only’ models to the tailored application of mainstream accounts. It 
is argued below that French scholars are at the forefront of a new agenda, which frees 
the ‘group’ from overly state-centric understandings of interest groups. 
 
Historical understandings of interest groups in France 
 
As an idea that can be traced back as far as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, interest group 
pressure is seen, historically, as being illegitimate (Thomas 2001: 48). Following the 
traditional French conception of democracy, Cohen-Tanugi (1991) underlines that 
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lobbying or interest groups represent an attempt to prioritise particular interests to the 
detriment of the general public. In the French Republican tradition, the state has been 
held to be superior to the total of competing interests: groups exist in a subordinate 
relationship with the state. The traditional role of the French state is classified as 
Jacobin, which stipulates that elected governments are mandated with the will of the 
people directly, without the mediation of other interests (Hazareesingh 2002).  
The traditional Jacobin distaste for interest groups is only partly relevant for 
contemporary state-group relations. Firstly, a transformation has occurred mainly 
through the loosening of state control of civil society. Secondly, there has been a 
modernisation of public administration that has ensured freedoms of access to 
information. More recently, the multi-faceted influence of the EU has been largely 
accredited with this change. Although French pressure group activity would appear to 
be weaker in France than in the northern European democracies, the traditional image 
of France as a state that pays no attention to associational life is becoming increasingly 
irrelevant to understanding the reality of French politics.   
 
Models of French exceptionalism 
 
With regards to conceptualising a relevant theoretical model, this mixture of a 
traditionally exclusive and an increasingly open state reinforced the ‘exceptional’ status 
of French state-group relations among Anglo-American scholars. Models of French 
‘exceptionalism’ may be defined as the situation where the policy-making style in 
France is different from the equivalent style in any other country. It was, therefore, 
contended that the French case cannot be easily fitted into the mainstream pluralist or 
corporatist models of state-group relations.  
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Two theoretical models of exception that have been applied to the French case 
are termed the ‘domination-crisis’ model, and the ‘endemic and open conflict’ model. 
The former concentrates on French attitudes towards authority and change. This 
analysis heavily relies upon traditional Jacobin feelings of suspicion and fear with 
regards to the validity of interest group existence. Accordingly, interest groups are 
poorly represented and highly fragmented under a highly authoritarian state. With very 
similar conclusions, the latter model shares the same authoritarian notion of the state, 
but it focuses on the importance of political institutions. It refers to the decreasing 
influence of Parliament and a generally hostile institutional environment for interest 
groups as the reasons for growing demonstrations, direct action and violence. Both 
models have also failed to adequately capture contemporary state-group relations (Elgie 
and Griggs 2000). 
The Marxist model is another longstanding ‘exceptional’ account of French 
state-group interaction. This standpoint has been further developed partly as a critique 
of pluralist perspectives in this area. The core argument concentrates on the inability of 
interest groups to influence government. Capitalist groups can manipulate a larger 
resource base, and ensure a well-organised and professional lobby of government. From 
this perspective, the Marxist/neo-Marxist approach to explaining state-group relations 
in France centres on the exclusion of any intermediate group between society and the 
capitalist elite. In light of certain ambiguities surrounding the definition and role of 
these capitalist groups, the main criticism of this model points to its highly idealist 
stance. Following such an argument, it ignores privileged links between some societal 
groups (such as agriculture) and government (Wilson 1983).          
The failure of the above models to adequately capture contemporary state-group 
relations in France led to the creation of the “untidy reality model”. Associated 
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originally with Vincent Wright (in his Government and Politics of France), this 
approach underlines the infinite variety of potential state-group interaction. The model 
highlights the divisions within governmental institutions, resulting in a competitive 
environment unable to present one voice. Moreover, interest groups enter into a 
multitude of relations with different organs of government. Knapp and Wright (2006) 
deal with four models (the ‘domination-crisis’, the ‘endemic and open conflict’, 
‘corporatist’ and ‘pluralist’ models of state-group interaction), and concludes by 
dismissing the validity of their findings. 
 
Mainstream state-centric models and France 
 
There has generally been an explicit debate between viewing state-group relations in 
France as pluralist (championed by Wilson 1987, 2008), and considering them as 
primarily corporatist (supported by Keeler and Hall 2001). French state-group relations 
capture some of the distinctive features within pluralism and corporatism, while 
presenting a number of unique traits. Corporatist accounts have concentrated on the 
tripartite relations between the state officials and the two key areas of capital and labour 
(Lavdas 2005). Pluralist studies have emphasised the multiplication of non-state actors 
in technical and non-technical deliberations with the state (Chafer and Godin 2010). 
Various empirical/theoretical studies are outlined below in order to demonstrate 
supporting and opposing evidence for these models.  
 
Pluralism 
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Wilson (2008) comments that the interest group universe in France is largely pluralist, 
but with a more active role played by government. It tries to structure the wide-ranging 
interests that are represented by using subsidies to reward allies and punish foes. By 
shaping policy process largely above the demands of competing interest group actors, 
the French case is often referred to as “state pluralism” (Elgie and Griggs 2000: 151). 
A range of group interests has been represented on approximately 5000 councils, 
committees and commissions at the national level, as well as double that figure at the 
local level, since the 1960s (Chafer and Godin 2010). The most well-organised and 
powerful groups (business, agriculture, industry) demand the attention of government 
representatives. The FNSEA (agricultural interest group) has benefited from a 
privileged partnership with government over agricultural matters (Thompson 2003).  
By attempting to create the most favourable balance of power, the French 
government also accords greater official recognition to certain interest groups than 
others. During the 1960s and 70s, the government purposefully disadvantaged the most 
powerful trade union (CGT) (Keeler and Hall 2001). From this perspective, a purist 
pluralistic standpoint is alien to the institutional and philosophical framework of the 
Fifth Republic (Woll 2009). All interest groups in France are not playing on a 
completely level playing field, as the state determines which players are legitimate. 
Contemporary French policy-making now reflects a rather uneasy compromise between 
Jacobin ideas and pluralism (Cole and Harguindeguy 2013). 
However, the recognition that French pluralism is different to the standard form 
of pluralism leads to possibly concluding that pluralism à la française may not be 
pluralism at all. The continued existence of privileged state-group partnerships 
underlines a major weakness in the assertion that the French case is pluralist. Not only 
do many of the privileged state-group relations still remain, they have been partly 
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expanded into new areas where the government confronts new intractable policy 
problems (Elgie and Griggs 2000). Moreover, the public officials in the various 
consultative bodies have the choice to accept or decline the advice given to them by 
interest groups. Many less-well organised interest groups bemoan the failure of officials 
to heed their opinion. French interest organisations rarely feel involved in policy-
making, despite the recent proliferation of consultative bodies (Le Queux and 
Sainsaulieu 2010). Pluralism cannot adequately explain the existence and impact of 
such well-defined privileged relations.  
 
Corporatism 
 
Industrial relations (employers’ organisations, trade unions and government) in France 
are cited as the core element to applying a corporatist viewpoint to French state-group 
relations. Neither the state, nor employers’ confederations have, however, been willing 
to grant trade unions the recognition of institutionalised power. In comparison to trade 
unions, employers’ organisations have sometimes managed to ensure a well-organised 
and professional lobby during industrial negotiations, which are considered in a more 
favourable light by government than presenting a poorly organised and fragmented 
voice. In fact, the state and employers’ federations have encouraged the isolation of 
trade unions by offering alternative institutional arrangements (Fitch 2007). 
There is one dominant employer’s interest group (MEDEF) that enjoys a 
privileged position in governmental relations. Presenting a study into educational 
policy-making and interest group structure in France and the US, Baumgartner and 
Walker (1989) find an inherent bias in the French system in allowing for intimate 
relations between the largest interest groups and state institutions and officials. In 
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contrast to the US, many decisions are made at the national level (as opposed to the 
local levels) almost exclusively by civil servants within the Ministry for Education in 
this particular case. The small size, poor resources and younger educational interest 
groups have resulted in a highly competitive and ideologically divergent environment. 
This has encouraged the government to maintain a structured and corporatist style of, 
in this example, educational decision-making in France. 
Wilson (1983, 2008) presents a series of arguments against the dominance of a 
corporatist standpoint on state-group relations in France. In contrast to other Western 
European countries, there has, firstly, been a feverish resistance among French trade 
unions to personal relations with government (Le Queux and Sainsaulieu 2010). 
Loyalties to syndicalist traditions have maintained an open unwillingness to participate 
in any corporatist practice. (Labbe 1994). Secondly, the existence of numerous trade 
unions and employers’ associations make it more difficult than in other European 
countries to present a united voice. In no country in Europe is the level of fragmentation 
comparable (Beyers et al. 2012). In trade unionism alone there are over twenty major 
interest groups with an additional myriad of approximately fifty to a hundred smaller 
organisations. Outside a handful of policy areas, it is indeed difficult to demonstrate 
corporatist patterns in state-group relations in France.  
 
Alternative state-centric models 
 
Both corporatism and pluralism have not proved to be entirely relevant or accurate for 
studying state-group interaction in France. Both models ignore the on-going concern 
for maintaining a certain level of autonomy, which is crucial for group members and 
governmental officials. Similarly, interest groups enter into different types of 
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relationships with the state on particular issues. Changing venues for power render 
previously influential and efficient policy-making coalitions irrelevant. These models 
also do not appreciate that state-group interaction can represent only one priority for 
either entity. Indeed, the importance of these relations for interest groups depends on 
their individual objectives (Wilson 2008). In referring to the French case, Wilson 
underlines that “a theory of interest-group/government relations must thus include 
recognition of external actors beyond the object of the theory and the activities and 
priorities of both groups and government that may detract from their interaction with 
each other” (Wilson 1987: 410).  
An attempt to apply a more relevant model has been the introduction of ‘policy 
network theory’ to French politics. In stark contrast to Britain, policy network theory 
had been “rarely, if ever, explicitly evoked in the French literature” (Cole and John 
1995: 92). This theory posits that decision-making is seldom limited to a group of key 
actors in certain organisations. Instead, a range of bargains is struck through 
negotiations between numerous bodies and organisations. In stark contrast to 
Baumgartner and Walker (1989), contemporary educational policy includes a wide 
range of actors within a policy network perspective, particularly in the implementation 
of an agreed policy. A deeper concentration on local level educational decision-making 
reveals a complex environment of policy networks (John and Cole 2000).  
 A more longstanding competing approach applied to the French case is referred 
to here as the ‘protest model’. It alludes to an alleged inclination towards protest 
behaviour among French citizens and groups. Accordingly, organisations are formed in 
order to defend very narrow interests (Wilson 2008). Many high profile cases have 
managed to successfully influence government policy. Sustained pressure from a wide 
range of anti-waste incinerator interest groups led to the abandonment of several waste-
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to-energy plants throughout France (McCauley 2009). There has also been a long list 
of protests from excluded agriculture groups against certain objectives of the CAP 
(Thompson 2003), cross-interest anti-GM food protests (Joly and Marris 2003, 
McCauley 2011, 2015) and indeed an even wider set of groups in the anti-globalisation 
protests (Fougier 2002, 2004, Le Queux and Sainsaulieu 2010).   
 
French contributions to moving beyond state-centric models 
 
From a notably Anglo-American standpoint, understandings of interest group relations 
in France are entrenched in mainstream comparative politics state-centric models (see 
table 1 below) of inclusion1 and exclusion2. The traditional Jacobin distaste for interest 
groups and the weakening of the ‘exception’ thesis have led to several attempts (Chafer 
and Godin 2010, Grossman 2009, Knapp and Wright 2006, Wilson 2008, Woll 2009) 
to theorise this relationship. This chapter argues below that we need to move beyond 
understanding French interest groups as simply locked within such state-centric 
models. Interest groups often participate in both including and excluding models. 
Policy processes also emphasise that these associations can be involved in both 
including and excluding models at the same time.  
 
  Table 1: State-centric models of inclusion and exclusion 
State-
Centric 
Models 
Inclusion Exclusion 
(neo-, meso-) Pluralism (neo-, meso-) Corporatism 
Policy Networks Protest 
 Source: Keeler and Hall (2001), Cole (2008), Wilson (2008), Vassallo (2010) 
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In response, the major contribution of French writings on interest groups is the 
emphasis on political sociology (Courty 2006, Duriez 2004, Fillieule 2010, Jacquot and 
Woll 2008, Mathieu 2007, Offerlé 2009, Saurugger 2008) above comparative or 
mainstream political science. It is evident above that the French contribution is most 
notable in the less conventional ‘protest model’ as well as new ‘sociological 
perspectives’ on Europeanisation. The inside-out influence of French scholarship on 
interest group studies begins with a rejection of the assumption that interest group 
behaviour is tied to state action. As Saurugger puts it, “the specificities of sociological 
approaches…lie in the spheres of ontology and epistemology…reject(ing) research 
designs and logics based on a strict unidirectional causality principle” (2009: 938). This 
inside-out influence challenges researchers in the field to embrace sociological 
approaches – even, as argued below, social movement theories.  
The distinctly sociological perspective in French literature has challenged 
researchers to examine bottom-up (i.e. Europeanisation of interest groups) 
Europeanisation through understanding processes of ‘usage’, introduced by Jacquot 
and Woll (2003). This is a call-to-arms for scholars to reflect upon how local or national 
interest groups ‘use’ opportunities that arise in a multi-level system – especially at the 
supranational level. Non-French writers have sought to emphasise the lack of bottom-
up Europeanisation taking place. Rootes (2005) and Warleigh (2001) has found that 
interest groups throughout Europe are not substantially Europeanising – in his view 
defined as relocation to Brussels – their activities. McCauley (2011) presents a more 
nuanced picture from a wide variety of interest representations of sporadic examples of 
bottom-up Europeanisation among French interest groups.  
In French writing, bottom-up Europeanisation is most associated with economic 
interest groups in France. Grossman (2003, 2004) demonstrates that French interest 
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groups involved in financial services are able to employ EU specialists and consultants 
while establishing offices in Brussels. The focus of such interests groups in France has 
“necessarily shifted towards Brussels” (Thomas 2001: 46). Privileged with substantial 
resources, they have learnt how to side-step the state’s traditional monopoly on 
economic affairs. The EU has increasingly served to alter the traditional balance in 
French state-society relations by allowing greater access and influence at the European 
level to French societal interests at the policy formulation stage. However, the ability 
of non-economic interests groups to follow suit is empirically less proven (Saurugger 
2007). Saurugger and Grossman (2006) emphasise the ‘contrainte financière’ 
(financial limitation) of such French groups to benefit from supranational opportunity 
structures. Interest group-based research should focus, therefore, on the role of 
organisations rather than the state.  
 
FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDAS: A ‘GROUP-CENTRIC’ 
APPROACH 
 
The third section proposes the development of a new research agenda, which builds on 
‘group-centric’ notions of interest groups behaviours. The ‘inside-out’ pressure of 
French scholarship reorients our understanding of the state and the group. Building on 
French and related non-French research, I propose below a more fluid account of the 
state than in mainstream pluralist or corporatist accounts. In addition to re-
conceptualising the state, we also need to find better ways of reflecting the abilities of 
interest groups. Due to space restrictions, I limit this investigation to focusing on 
resource capabilities of the group. This section ends with the development of a new 
‘group-centric’ framework for interest group analysis. 
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The State as multiple opportunities and constraints 
 
The presence of sympathetic elites increases opportunities for interest groups to 
maximise the political system. Jacquot and Woll (2008) reveal that interest groups tend 
to engage in more conventional lobbying activities when there are discernable allies in 
the political process. With fewer or no allies, they are more likely to concentrate on 
protests and demonstrations. Political parties are especially important potential allies 
for challenging groups or movements. The SOS Loire Vivante, an interest group in 
opposition to a dam at Serre de la Fare, benefited from the support of local politicians. 
Although the dam project was originally a socialist party project, many PS local figures 
came out in opposition to the programme after a series of municipal elections (Hayes 
2002, Hayes and Ollitrault 2014). 
 The EU has multiplied both restrictions and opportunities for various 
movements (Grossman 2009, Saurugger 2009). McCauley (2011) underlines that future 
research on interest groups in France should involve at least the inclusion of European 
level opportunities (bottom-up Europeanisation). He finds that political opportunity 
holds out promise for the analysis of the inter-, supra- and trans-national level. Tarrow 
elaborates further, “Europeans are beginning to realise more and more that the sources 
of many of their claims…are increasingly found in Europe’s integrated market and 
institutions…(with) open opportunities for coalitions of actors…to exploit its 
(Europe’s) political opportunities” (2001: 237, 243). There has been a substantial 
increase in interest group activity at the EU level throughout the last two decades. 
Groups have now begun to see the European Commission in greater terms as an 
opportunity structure.     
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The following model (Figure 1) is primarily derived and adapted from Hayes 
(2002), and Kriesi (2004). It is essentially a three-pronged model with political 
opportunity structures set alongside the configuration of political actors and within the 
specific context of interaction. It analyses the ‘receptivity of political elites to collective 
action’ through examining how the actors are structured, as well as their interaction 
patterns. Opportunity structures represent the first level of analysis of the political 
opportunity model. The core of the structures consists of the formal political 
institutions, which can be considered as either ‘open’ or ‘closed’. Kriesi’s model (2004) 
holds that increased decentralisation and the separation of power results in wider formal 
access and opportunities for groups to exploit. This model emphasises rather the key 
role of EU institutions and actors in determining the level of access for non-state actors.  
  
Figure 1: An Enlarged Model of the State 
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Source: Inspired by Hayes (2002) and Kriesi (2004)  
 
Cultural models refer to the adoption of either ‘exclusive’ (repressive, confrontational) 
or ‘integrative’ (cooperative and inclusive) strategies that are usually rooted in a 
country’s political system. Additionally, they refer to cultural or symbolic opportunities 
that determine the ideas that are visible and resonate with the public. Full access to 
political opportunities is ensured if both institutional and cultural/symbolic integrative 
opportunities are readily available. EU institutions influence both the institutional 
structures and the cultural models. Firstly, EU level institutions provide a different 
supranational institutional and cultural setting for non-state actors. Secondly, the 
involvement of national institutions in EU level decision-making can lead to domestic 
institutional or cultural transformation. 
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Actor configurations, the second level of analysis, represent what we know 
about the actors at a given point in time and the extent to which their interests are 
compatible with each other. The configuration of actors is essentially the result of 
processes of actor and coalition formation (Kriesi 2004). This represents the starting 
point for the examination of any strategic interaction between non-state actors, their 
allies and its adversaries, i.e. the interaction context. The third level of analysis (the 
interaction context) systematises the interaction between strategies adopted by both 
national and supranational non-state and state actors. Interaction among and between 
the non-state and state actors modifies in turn the larger political context, re-configuring 
the relevant actors, and facilitates/represses further political opportunities for non-state 
actors. 
In addition to acknowledging an enlarged conceptualisation of the state (defined 
here as the political opportunity model), interest group scholarship must equally 
appreciate the ever-changing nature of political structures, the configuration of actors 
and patterns of interaction. Shifts in actors and interactive patterns may increase 
political opportunities for particular groups. Power between groups is often 
redistributed in favour of the previously excluded or currently powerful. Change is best 
understood within the policy-making process (Hayes 2002). It consists of three distinct 
phases: agenda-setting, decision-making and policy implementation. Each phase can 
mobilise different actors in a wide range of multi-level venues. This idea is termed as 
‘policy opportunity windows’. Irrespective of policy cycle, opportunity windows 
provide a series of timeframes (agenda-setting, decision-making/policy translation and 
implementation) for analyzing interest group behavior. 
 
Resources and interest groups      
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Resource mobilisation theory posits simply that sufficient levels of resources are 
needed for initial and sustained mobilisation. In other words, “the group can do no 
more than its resources…permit” (Freeman 1979: 167). Accordingly, the behaviour and 
existence of a group depends on a variety of resources. This theory emphasises the key 
role of rational incentives for collective action (Offerlé 1998). The principal hypothesis 
posits that the activity of any group is increased when it acquires more resources. As a 
result, the groups with more resources can exert more effort for all types of political 
action. Dalton et al. (2003) reiterates, indeed, that poorer resourced interest groups are 
more likely to concentrate on more confrontational activities. In contrast, better-
resourced associations are more able to enact a wider series of cooperative and 
confrontational activities. 
 Resource mobilisation theory emerged in the late 1960s with Olson’s “The 
Logic of Collective Action”, in response to the shortcomings of classical collective 
behaviour theories. It sought to develop an understanding of what makes collective 
action possible. Although it does not systematically evaluate different resources, his 
work introduces the relationship between group size and the effectiveness of the group 
(Olson 1965). Obershall (1973) used this theory to identify and define potential 
resources for individual actors in reacting against the state. Tilly (1978) introduced the 
importance of internal organisation for interest groups. 
The size of the organisation is a resource that can play a crucial role in its overall 
strategy. Dalton et al. (2003) found that groups with large staffs were more likely to be 
involved in all forms (both conventional and non-conventional) of political activity. 
Often vital for civil society organisations is the size of their voluntary and membership 
base. However, the level of funding is often cited as the most significant material 
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resource for mobilising collective action (McCauley 2015). Two factors in the funding 
issue of civil society associations are identified as particularly significant. Firstly, the 
origin of funding can sometimes determine the potential remit of the association while 
limiting its overall agenda (Woll 2007). Secondly, the level of funding can often control 
the life span of an association. 
 Experience can often act as a critical resource for interest groups. Sometimes 
the experience of individuals becomes the most important resource for certain 
organisations (Fillieule 2012). Igoe (2003) revealed that the lack of experienced 
individuals in a lands right movement in Tanzania resulted in the future of member 
groups hinging on one individual’s decision. In addition to personal or individual 
experiences, the experience of the particular organisation can also represent an essential 
resource. Dalton (1994) demonstrates that older organisations tend to partake in 
conventional forms of behaviour (lobbying, consultation), largely due to a legitimacy 
and knowledge base built up throughout time. The less experienced younger 
organisations were often found to concentrate on protests and demonstrations. Many 
organisations decide to concentrate on the national arena because they have already 
experienced the “habits of action” necessary to operate effectively in the national 
system (Ollitrault 2001).  
 Interest groups frequently seek to form and join various umbrella organisations 
at both the national and European levels (Duriez 2004). In an EU context, the 
Commission has often displayed a preference for dealing with European-wide umbrella 
organisations. The growth of MNNPE (Multi-National Non-Profit Enterprises) has 
created multiple opportunities memberships for smaller associations (Woll 2006). 
These associations can take advantage of the superior resources wielded by the ‘parent’ 
group (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). In both cases, there is always a trade off between 
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gaining resources while maintaining independence. Involvement in umbrella 
organisations, larger parent organisations, and national and transnational networks 
often increases mobilisation through benefiting from a heightened sense of legitimacy.  
 Cole and Harguindeguy (2013) underline the pivotal role of a common 
philosophy and ideology to the mobilisation of direct action on language rights in 
France. A sense of solidarity between activists ensured the long-term survival of loosely 
formed organisations or movements. Moreover, their shared belief structure became as 
important as other resources in stimulating collective action (Fillieule and Meyer 2001). 
La Goutte d’eau campaign3 is an example of how sustained mobilisation can be ensured 
through shared ideology alone (Doidy 2004). Moreover, memberships and networks 
(see above) often provide resources to local environmental groups through a strong 
ideological collective belief in a shared philosophy (Ollitrault 2004). These shared 
belief structures can both differ between groups and influence the form of mobilisation. 
It is acknowledged that treatment of this resource category cannot cover such issues in 
any real depth. As a result, particular attention should be accorded to examining the 
core issue of a group’s ideology vis-à-vis the state. 
 
A New group-centric framework for interest group studies 
 
Commentators continue to struggle with the nature of state-group relations in France. 
The seemingly exceptional circumstances posed by the French case have led numerous 
authors to elaborate specific frameworks. Domination-crisis, endemic/open and 
Marxist models have all been unsuccessful in fully explaining the relationship between 
the French state and interest groups. Perhaps the ‘untidy reality model’ is the 
embodiment of this failure. It admits overtly that the best description for such relations 
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would simply be ‘complex and untidy’. However, a myriad of authors maintain that 
this complexity is best understood as variations on both traditional comparative politics 
models and more recently applied approaches in this area. It is argued here that these 
attempts have also failed to adequately describe state-group relations in France. We still 
find ourselves unsatisfied with both traditional ‘exceptional’ accounts as well as more 
recent ‘mainstream’ comparative politics attempts to understand French state-group 
relations. This chapter has argued that we need to include concepts found in social 
movement theory to our understanding of state-group interaction. 
Inspired by French political sociological accounts, figure 2 sets out a proposed 
new theoretical framework for analysing interest groups. It assesses the dynamics 
involved in a group’s decision to exploit shifting opportunities in light of the size and 
composition of its resource base (resource-opportunity usage). There are three distinct 
opportunity windows located within any policy development: agenda-setting, decision-
making/policy translation and policy implementation (Hayes 2002). Different 
institutions, cultural models and actors are more/less involved according to the specific 
policy opportunity window. From this perspective, political opportunity structures, the 
configuration of political actors and the interaction context can all differ according to 
the particular opportunity window. As a result, this framework outlines three separate 
(and potentially distinct) policy windows in accordance with the three phases of policy 
development. Above all, this group-centric model analyses the strategies of civil society 
groups within shifting opportunities. 
 
Figure 2: Resource-Opportunity Usage for Interest Groups 
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Source: Inspired by Hayes (2002), Kriesi (2004) and McCauley (2011) 
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(connected with the latter) action repertoires. The particular strategy (one or more direct 
and/or soft action repertoires) targets the interaction context. More precisely, the group 
attempts to influence the collective/individual strategies of both EU and domestic 
policy actors. The resulting ‘facilitation’ or ‘repression’ of the group can lead to a shift 
in the future strategic decisions of the group within or between policy phases.  
The ‘group’ is considered in the resource-opportunity usage model to be a 
rational actor that responds to its resource capacities and operating environment. It 
selects from a broad list of either ‘soft’ or ‘direct’ action repertoires as a reaction to 
facilitory or repressive opportunity structures. As a result, there are three important 
limitations found with the explanatory and predictive value of this model. It does not, 
firstly, provide a detailed account of the collective moral imperative driving the overall 
movement. The model largely concentrates on individual accounts of resource and 
opportunity exploitation. Secondly, there is insufficient space to explore individual 
moral imperatives. The ‘ideological’ resource type is capable of only modest 
contributions to understanding psychological reasons for mobilisation. This approach 
does not, thirdly, seek to offer non-resource/opportunity explanations for mobilisation 
activities. The limitations stated above are a necessary discipline for exploring a 
resource-opportunity account of why only certain interest groups mobilise when others 
do not. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The state should not take precedence in the study of interest groups. To revise Truman’s 
interpretation (1951), the “corridors of power” are not uniquely associated with 
government – but also Oxfam, WWF, Transparency International, as well as newer 
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organisations such as Wikimedia Foundation or FrontlineSMS. In the study of 
government, we are increasingly ready to accept that power is dispersed throughout a 
myriad of local, regional, supranational, international and horizontal networks of 
power. We must adopt a similar understanding in the study of interest groups. Groups 
allocate as much time to ‘lobbying’ each other than the, now, many guises of the state. 
We should, therefore, adopt, adapt and apply research frameworks that are sensitive to 
this new reality. 
 French scholarship offers a significant contribution to broadening our 
understanding of interest groups in line with these new realities. A transformed French 
state, within an ever-changing multi-faceted European and decentralisation context, has 
inspired a deep exploration of interest group activities. Above all, a distinctly 
sociological outlook emerges from the resultant literature. Whilst acknowledging the 
role of the state, French scholars have theorised more on when, how and why interest 
groups act, or indeed, do not. This presents a more fluid understanding than the static 
modeling undertaken on French politics by largely Anglo-American scholars. It offers, 
moreover, new research agendas for interest group studies beyond France. 
 This chapter has, finally, proposed a ‘group-centric’ approach to the study of 
interest groups in and beyond France. Research on interest groups is at an exciting 
moment in time. The multiplication of organisations, types of activities, loci of power, 
challenges researchers to find new ways of exploring the many ‘truths’ (from a social 
science ontological perspective) of interest group reality.  
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NOTES 
1 Inclusion is defined from the perspective of interest groups as participation in formal 
decision-making processes. 
2 Exclusion is also defined from the perspective of interest groups as the prohibition of 
such groups from formal decision-making processes 
3 This is a mountain ranch that was occupied by Eric Petetin on the site of a proposed 
European road project. It became the venue for concerts, festivals, public debates and 
general assemblies arranged by local groups. Throughout a 10-year period, la Goutte 
d’eau created a loosely knit network of environmental groups, ecologists and 
sympathisers (Doidy 2004).       
4 Various forms of protests, aggression and disobedience represent ‘direct’ forms of 
action repertoires.  
5 Lobbying, publishing reports, providing expertise (and generally non confrontational 
activities) is basically characterised as ‘soft’ forms of action repertoires.    
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